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terms, lowers the estimate only slightly. Historical variables, such as the incidence of 
slavery, do not explain the effect away. Adding US states unaffected by the Civil War, 
we argue that the friction is not merely reflecting unmeasured North-South differences. 
Finally, the estimated border effect is larger for differentiated than for homogeneous 
goods, stressing the potential role for cultural factors and trust. 
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150 years after Confederate troops attacked Fort Sumter in South Carolina,
a recent US-wide survey by the Pew Research Center summarizes the ﬁndings
as: ‘‘The Civil War at 150: Still Relevant, Still Divisive”.1 The poll reports that
56 percent of Americans believe that the Civil War is still relevant to politics and
publiclifetoday. Andthat4in10SouthernerssympathizewiththeConfederacy.
ButdoesthelongdefunctborderbetweentheConfederationandtheUnionstill
affect economic relations between US states that belonged to different alliances
today? Is the former border still relevant, still divisive? This paper sheds light
on this question using bilateral trade ﬂows between states.
The Civil war has cost 620,000 American lives, more than any other military
conﬂict. Golden and Lewis (1975) document that it has retarded the economic
development of the whole nation and of the South in particular. And, as the
Pew poll shows, the nation is still divided along the lines of the former alliances
over whether the war was fought over moral issues – slavery – or over economic
policy. Yet, long before the war, the Southern and the Northern economies dif-
fered: The South was dominated by large-scale plantations of cotton, tobacco,
rice, and sugar, whose proﬁtability relied on forced labor. It exported crops to
Europe and imported manufacturing goods from there. The North, dominated
by smaller land-holdings, was rapidly urbanizing; slavery was practically abol-
ished north of the Mason-Dixon Line by 1820.2 Its infant manufacturing indus-
tries were protected by import tariffs against European competition.
The North-South divide is very visible in contemporaneous state-level data.
On average, the South is still poorer, more rural, more agricultural, less edu-
cated, more religious, and has different political views. The economic gap may
have narrowed (Michener and McLean, 1999), in particular after the end of seg-
regation in the Sixties of the last century. But, political disagreement, in partic-
ularontheroleoffederalgovernment, continuestobesetthecountry. Aspecial
1Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, “Civil War at 150: Still Relevant, Still
Divisive”, Apri 8, 2011; available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1958/.
2The Mason-Dixon Line settled a conﬂict between British Colonies in America and set the
common borders of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and West Virginia.TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 3
sense of Southern identity continues to mark a cultural divide within the US.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the long-shadow of his-
tory for economic transactions (Nitsch and Wolf, 2009; Falck et al., 2010; Head
et al., 2010). It shows that the former border still constitutes a discontinuity
in the economic geography of the United States. The modern literature has
identiﬁedculturaldifferencesacrosscountriesasimpedimentsofinternational
trade, but typically not within the same country. Estimates of various border ef-
fects abound in the literature and there are well-tested empirical methods to
measure their trade-inhibiting force. The more challenging question in this pa-
per is: Can the estimated border effect be interpreted as a genuine Union-vs-
Confederation effect?
Weproceedinthreesteps. First,employingthetheory-consistent(butparsi-
monious) gravity model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), henceforth AvW,
for bilateral trade between states, we ﬁnd a robust, statistically signiﬁcant, and
economically meaningful trade-inhibiting effect of the former border. In the
preferred 1993 data, on average, the historical border reduces trade between
states of the former Confederation or Union between 22 and 16 percent. In
comparison, the Canada-US border restricts trade by 155 to 165 percent (AvW).
Nitsch and Wolf (2011) ﬁnd that the former border between East and West Ger-
manyrestrictstradebyabout26to30percentin2004. Runningamillionplace-
bos, we show that no other border between random groups of (old) US states
yields a stronger trade-reducing effect. The result is robust to employing al-
ternative methodologies, using different waves of the Commodity Flow Survey
(1997, 2002, 2007), drawing on sectoral rather than aggregate bilateral trade
data, or measuring transportation costs differently (travel time instead of sheer
geographicaldistance). Includingtherestoftheworld,ordifferenttreatmentof
states, whose allegiance to either the Union or the Confederation is historically
not obvious, does not change the results. The estimated border effect repre-
sents an ad valorem tariff equivalent of about 2 to 8 percent. Interestingly, the
effect is stronger (and more robust) in the food, manufacturing, and chemicals4 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
sectors than in mining, which is characterized by a completely standardized
good, ormachinery, wherethepatternofspecializationacrossNorthandSouth
is very strong.
In a second step, we add a large array of contemporaneous variables to the
original AvW model to account for observable differences between the South
and the North. The controls are meant to capture migrant, ethnic, or religious
networks. While these variables matter empirically, they do not reduce the esti-
mated border effect. We account for cultural differences expressed by different
colonial relations across states, for different patterns of urbanization, and for
additional geographical variables. We include variables that relate to the in-
stitutional setup of states, or that measure differences in the judicial system.
We control for differences in endowment proportions, or for differences in the
structureofthestates’economies. Finally,weadddemographicfactorsandtest
the Linder hypothesis. Most of these controls have some explanatory power,
but they do not undo the border effect. The estimate falls from 16 to 13 per-
cent. This ﬁnding survives the same battery of robustness checks applied to the
parsimonious model.
Third, we acknowledge that the North-South border, marked by the Seces-
sion, is likelynot to be exogenous. Engerman and Sokoloff (2000 and2005) sug-
gestthatitisrelatedtoendowmentdifferencesbetweenNorthernandSouthern
states in cropland, or in the size and structure of agricultural production. The
emergence of the border may have to do with historical ethnic patterns, histor-
ical educational achievements of the population, or institutional differences as
captured by the historical incidence of malaria as in Acemoglu et al. (2002). Fi-
nally, and most importantly, it may result from the incidence of slavery. Not all
of these variables matter empirically for contemporaneous trade patterns, but
they cannot easily be excluded from the explanation of contemporaneous bi-
lateral trade on conceptual grounds. Including them into the gravity equation
does not undo the ‘Secession effect’. Quite to the opposite, the estimated effect
actually increases. Finally, we extend the analysis to Western states, but keepTRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 5
the same coding of the border. Thus, we add pairs of states which have been
completely unaffected by the Secession. Then, the border dummy essentially
captureswhethertwostateshavebeenonopposingsidesoftheCivilWarrather
than belonging to the North or the South. We continue to ﬁnd a border effect (7
to 18 percent), which can now be attributed more plausibly to the Secession.
The literature offers explanations of border effects in terms of ‘political bar-
riers’, ‘artefact’, and ‘fundamentals’. The ﬁrst should be largely absent in an in-
tegrated economy such as the US. The second relates to difﬁculties in separat-
ing the impact of border-related trade barriers from the impact of geographical
distance (Head and Mayer, 2002) or to problems of statistical aggregation (Hill-
berry and Hummels, 2008). We deal with these issues by using alternative mea-
sures of trade costs and by a large amount of placebo exercises. We view our
results as consistent with the ‘fundamentals’ approach: historical events have
shaped cultural determinants of trade which still matter today.
The literature on border effects was pioneered by McCallum (1995), who
ﬁndsthattradevolumesbetweenCanadianprovinceswereabout22timeslarger
than those between Canada and the US in 1988. Subsequent research3 shows
that states usually trade 5 to 20 times more domestically than internationally.
Few studies have moved from simply exploring border barriers to investigating
and explaining potential causes. Wei (1996) and Hillberry (1999) do not ﬁnd
that tariffs, quotas, exchange rate variability, transaction costs, and regulatory
differences can explain the border effect. Recent studies illustrate that the im-
pact of borders also extends to the sub-national level, implying that additional
reasons for high local trade levels must exist. Examples are Wolf (1997 and
2000), Hillberry and Hummels (2003), Combes et al. (2005), Buch and Toubal
(2009), and Nitsch and Wolf (2009).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I. provides de-
3Helliwell (1997, 1998, 2002); Wei (1996), Hillberry (1999, 2002); Wolf (1997, 2000); Nitsch
(2000); Parsley and Wei (2001); Hillberry and Hummels (2003); AvW (2003); Chen (2004); Feen-
stra (2004); Combes et al. (2005); Millimet and Osang (2005); Baier and Bergstrand (2009); Buch
and Toubal (2009); Nitsch and Wolf (2009) to name only a few.6 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
tails of the empirical strategy. Section II. describes the benchmark results,
placebo estimations and a sensitivity analysis. Section III. uses a large array of
contemporaneous controls to address a potential omitted variables problem.
While Section IV. attempts to explain the ‘Secession effect’ by historical vari-
ables and by adding Western states to the analysis. The last section concludes.
I. Empirical Strategy and Data
A. Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy follows Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and the sub-
sequent research. Based on a multi-country framework of the Krugman (1980)
constant elasticity of substitution model with iceberg trade costs, the literature
stresses that the consistent estimation of bilateral barriers requires to take mul-
tilateral trade resistance into account. In this paper, we use the nonlinear least
squares (NLS) model suggested by AvW (2003) to estimate the border effect.
We also employ an approach that uses state speciﬁc ﬁxed effects to control for
multilateral resistance. Finally, we implement the idea of Baier and Bergstrand
(2009) to linearize the model by help of a ﬁrst order expansion of the multilat-
eral resistance terms. In all setups, we proxy trade costs by geographical dis-
tance and the historical border between the former alliances of states in the
Union and the Confederacy.
AvW (2003) show that the CES demand system with symmetric trade costs
can be written as















and zij  xij=(YiYj) is the value of bilateral exports xij between state i and state
j relative to the product of the states’ GDPs, Yi and Yj: 0 is a constant across
state pairs, 1 =  (   1) and 2 =  (   1), where  > 1 is the elasticity ofTRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 7
substitution. Borderij = (1   ij) represents the historical border line between
Union and Confederate states, which takes a value of unity if states in the pair
historically belonged to opposing alliances and zero otherwise. lnDistij is the
log of geographical distance between states. Xij denotes a vector of additional
controls. AvW set 
 = 0 and focus on a parsimonious gravity model. In our
exercise, we switch 
 on and off and work with various vectors Xij: k is the
share of income of state k in world income; ij is the standard error term.





j dependonestimatesof ^ 1 and ^ 2 inanon-linear
fashion. AvW (2003) propose estimating their gravity model by means of an it-
erative procedure that minimizes the sum of squared residuals in (1), while si-
multaneously using (2) to obtain values for the multilateral resistance terms.
Baier and Bergstrand (2009) propose to apply a ﬁrst order linear expansion
to (2), to solve for the multilateral price indices, and substitute the solution
into (1). The ensuing log linear equation can be estimated by means of simple
OLS. In the present case, this amounts to including multilateral resistance (MR)
terms for distance (MRDistij) and the border (MRBorderij) into the equation.
Finally, we follow a large strand of literature (Hummels, 1999; AvW, 2003;
Feenstra, 2004; Redding and Venables, 2004) and apply origin and destination
ﬁxed effects in an OLS gravity regression. The ﬁxed effects capture all time-
invariant origin and destination speciﬁc determinants, such as multilateral re-
sistance terms, but also geographical characteristics and historical or cultural
facts. In that sense, this model is more general than the two other ones, since it
accounts for any country-level unobserved heterogeneity.
B. Data Sources
For within- and cross-state trade ﬂows, we focus on bilateral export data from
the 1993, 1997, 2002, and 2007 Commodity Flow Surveys (CFS) collected by the
Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The CFS tracks shipments in net selling
values in millions of dollars. The CFS covers 200,000 (100,000; 50,000; 100,000)8 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
representative US ﬁrms for 1993 (1997; 2002; 2007). The literature is concerned
about the low number of ﬁrms surveyed in the waves after 1993, see Erlebaum
et al. (2006). For this reason, existing studies have usually focused on the 1993
wavewhichrepresentsabout25percentofregisteredUSﬁrms; wefollowinthis
tradition. GDP by state stems from the Regional Economic Accounts, provided
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Bilateral distance is calculated as the great
circle distance between state capitals. Intrastate distance is measured as in Wei
(1996) as the quarter of the distance between a state and its closest neighbor.4
FIGURE 1
Union versus Confederate States
Our primary sample consists of 28 US states divided into two groups that
originate from the split caused by the Secession (as shown in Figure 1). The
South comprises 11 states, while the North consists of 17 states, as listed in
Table 1. Five states (Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri and West Vir-
ginia)areexcludedfromthebenchmarksamplesincesoldiersfromthesestates
fought on both sides of the Civil War and the allegiance to either group of states
is unclear. Still today, these ﬁve states do not belong to the (fuzzily deﬁned)
“deep South”.5 Somewhat abusing terminology, we call these 5 states border
4This is the common practice in the literature, see also AvW (2003), Feenstra (2004), as well
as Baier and Bergstrand (2009).
5Reed and Reed (1997) deﬁne the “deep South” as an area roughly coextensive with the oldTRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 9






















Table 2 shows averages and standard deviations (for the year of 1993) of
the variables used in this study. Southern states have on average substantially
larger shares of Afro-Americans (22.9 versus 7.4 percent); the share of Chris-
tians is higher while the share of Jewish citizens is smaller (0.8 versus 2.1 per-
cent). ThepercentageshareofurbanpopulationislowerinSouththaninNorth
(65.6 versus 72.9). Historically (as of 1860), average farm sizes were substan-
tially larger in the South than in the North; this gap has closed since then. The
same is true for educational outcomes (illiteracy and average schooling). The
GDP per capita average across the South is about 12 percent lower than the av-
cotton belt from eastern North Carolina through South Carolina west into East Texas, with ex-
tensions north and south along the Mississippi.10 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
erage across the North. The most dramatic differences in 1993 data pertain to
institutional variables: The North is much more unionized than the South. All
Northern states had a minimum wage while only 45 percent of the Southern
states had one. In the 1992 presidential election, 64 percent of Southern states
voted Republican while only 12 of Northern states did.6
II. The Effect of the Former Union-Confederation Border
A. Benchmark Results
Estimating equation (1) allows assessing the average impact of the border on
cross-border North-South trade ﬂows relative to within region ﬂows. Table 3
provides our benchmark results for the year of 1993. Estimates of the AvW
(2003) NLS model are shown in column (1). In line with the gravity literature,
the estimated elasticity of distance is very close to  1. The coefﬁcient on the
border variable in column (1) indicates that the border reduces trade ﬂows be-
tween the North and the South by about 19.6 percent (e 0:218   1) in 1993. That
estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. This is the same as to
say that “within” trade is by the factor 1.24 (e0:218) bigger than “between” trade.
The associated ad valorem tariff equivalent of the border is 2.5 to 11.5 percent,
depending on the choice of elasticity of substitution.7 Compared to interna-
tional border effects, this is quite a reasonable amount for a barrier to trade on
the subnational level caused by an event more than a century ago. AvW (2003)
ﬁnd that cross-border trade for the Canada-US case is about 80.8 percent lower
than within trade.8 This amounts to a tariff equivalent of 20 to 128 percent. Re-
sults by Nitsch and Wolf (2011) suggest that the former East-West border within
6North-South differences are also clearly visible when looking at pairs of states. Table A-1 in
the Web Appendix differentiates between the sample of all pairs (N = 768) and the sample of
cross-border pairs (states from different sides of the historical border; N = 364).
7Broda et al. (2006) estimate elasticities of substitution with a median of 3.8 and a mean of
12.1. The elasticity of substitution they estimate for the US is 2.4. We follow the recent literature
and calculate tariff equivalents according to a range of the elasticity of substitution between 3
and 10.
8Table 2 in AvW, two-country model: e 1:65   1.TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 11
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics by State, 1993
Unit of Observation: State Level
Sample North (N = 17) South (N = 11) Description
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Black Share 7.412 5.519 22.855 7.871 Share (%) of blacks in population.
Jewish Share 2.105 2.339 0.809 1.285 Share (%) of Jewish in population.
Christian Share 86.882 3.059 91.636 3.139 Share (%) of Christian in population.
Other Religion Share 1.131 0.786 0.919 0.416 Share (%) of people with other religion.
No Religion Share 7.647 1.998 5.000 1.673 Share (%) of people with no religion.
Urban Share 72.853 16.095 65.655 12.098 Share (%) of urban population.
ln 1860 Cropland 15.038 1.045 15.228 0.806 1860 cropland in 1,000 acres.
ln 1860 Farm Size 4.785 0.184 5.940 0.291 1860 average farm size in acres.
ln 1860 Population Density 3.338 1.384 2.454 0.929 1860 population by square km.
ln 1860 Illiteracy Rates 1.604 0.415 2.683 0.303 1860 share of non-slave illiterate.
1860 Slave Share 0.020 0.046 34.506 14.304 1860 slaves in population.
1860 Free Black Share 1.018 0.999 1.170 1.326 1860 free blacks in population.
1860 French Share 0.302 0.202 0.254 0.619 1860 French in population.
1860 Spanish Share 0.004 0.005 0.032 0.076 1860 Spanish in population.
1860 Irish Share 6.890 4.303 0.918 1.057 1860 Irish in population.
1860 German Share 4.772 4.244 0.886 1.271 1860 German in population.
1860 British Share 4.250 2.216 0.306 0.204 1860 (American) British in population.
1860 Malaria Risk 0.126 0.073 0.351 0.057 1860 Malaria Risk Index.
ln Capital-Labor Ratio 11.610 0.261 11.520 0.227 Capital relative to Labor.
ln High-Low Skilled Ratio 0.264 0.316 -0.256 0.256 Bachelor to high school, age 25 and older.
ln Average Schooling 2.579 0.023 2.538 0.023 Years of Schooling.
ln Cropland 7.821 2.223 8.574 0.656 Cropland in 1,000 acres.
ln Farm Size 5.309 0.570 5.574 0.424 Average farm size in acres.
ln Agricultural / Total Output -4.515 0.687 -4.159 0.427 Agri. over total output, mio US $.
ln Manufacturing / Total Output -1.615 0.250 -1.661 0.364 Manuf. over total output, mio US $.
ln Population 15.237 1.009 15.534 0.624 Total Population in thousands.
ln Population Density 5.175 1.145 4.602 0.485 Population by square km.
ln Fertility 4.127 0.071 4.184 0.065 Live births per 1,000 women, age 15-44.
ln Income Per Capita 10.194 0.134 10.073 0.117 Total GDP per capita.
Union Membership 18.106 5.470 8.436 2.826 Percentage of union membership.
Union Density 19.812 5.218 10.382 3.009 Percentage of union density.
Minimum Wage 1 0 0.454 0.522 1 if state has minimum wage, 0 else.
Republican 0.118 0.332 0.636 0.505 1 if republican, 1992 pres. election, 0 else.
Judiciary Election 1.824 0.883 1.182 0.405 1 if judiciary is elected, 0 else.
Notes: Data sources as in Table A-1 (Web Appendix).
Germany reduces cross-border trade by about 20.5 percent relative to within-12 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
region trade.9
In column (2), we estimate the model using origin and destination ﬁxed ef-
fects, which account for all unobserved importer and exporter characteristics.
Our model explains 87 percent of the variation in trade patterns. Under ﬁxed
effects, cross-border trade is on average 14.5 percent smaller than within re-
gion trade. Hence, the border equals a tariff of 2 to 8 percent. The FE estimate
is very close to that obtained under NLS. This is in line with Feenstra (2004),
who also ﬁnds a slightly smaller but comparable effect to the AvW (2003) esti-
mation in the Canada-US case. In column (3), we use two indicator variables
to measure within-group trade relative to cross-border trade separately for the
North and the South. We ﬁnd that trade within the South is 1.78 times larger
than cross-border trade with the North in 1993. Contrarily, the North trades 1.3
times less within the region than across the border. This result is interesting as
weexpecttoﬁndapositivesignonbothindicatorvariables. Thestrongpositive
impact on within South trade and the much smaller negative impact on within
North trade could relate to current account imbalances within the US. As states
in the North run on average a current account surplus, the North trades more
with the South than with itself. States in the South, however, run on average
a current account deﬁcit and thus trade more among themselves and with the
North. However, that result is not robust; see column (6).10
In column (4), we estimate a “multicountry” model. We consider trade be-
tween US states, between 20 OECD countries11 and exports from individual US
states to OECD countries12 into the ﬁxed effects model of column (2). We use
OECD trade, distance and GDP data provided by AvW and US state exports to
9Table 2a in Nitsch and Wolf (2011), pooled OLS in 2004: e 0:229   1.
10This result vanishes when counting the border states into the South (Table A-6 of the Web
Appendix), or when adding Western states to the analysis (Table 9).
11These include Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
12WefocusonexportsfromUSstatestotheOECDasimportdataofindividualUSstatesfrom
OECD states (and vice versa) are not available.TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 13
OECD countries from Robert Feenstra’s webpage.13 Column (4) reports that the
distance parameter remains close to -1, while the border reduces North-South
trade within the US by 16.9 percent. Sample size increases to 1,776 observa-
tions, while the explanation power of our model increases only slightly to 87.7
percent.14
TABLE 3
Basic Border Effect Results
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
Year of Data: 1993
Data: Aggregated Commodity
—————————————————————————————– ——————
Speciﬁcation: AvW NLS Fixed Effects FE Multi OLS with MR Terms Chen (2004) FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Border Dummyij -0.218*** -0.157*** -0.185*** -0.157*** -0.090***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
South-South Dummyij 0.578*** 0.462***
(0.10) (0.08)
North-North Dummyij -0.264*** -0.050
(0.09) (0.05)
lnDistanceij -0.979*** -1.108*** -1.108*** -0.993*** -1.055*** -1.039*** -0.978***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Fixed Effects
Importer n.a. YES YES YES - - -
Exporter n.a. YES YES YES - - -
ImporterCommodity n.a. - - - - - YES
ExporterCommodity n.a. - - - - - YES
Multilateral Resistance n.a. - - - YES YES -
Observations 768 768 768 1,776 768 768 13,303
Adjusted R2 n.a. 0.874 0.874 0.877 0.751 0.759 0.636
Notes: Constant and ﬁxed effects not reported. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. n.a. means
not applicable. AvW NLS denotes the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) Nonlinear Least Squares Method.
States in sample as in Table 1. District of Columbia is excluded. In column (4), we adapt a multicountry ﬁxed
effects approach and add exports of individual US states to 20 OECD countries and between OECD trade. ***
Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Next, we estimate equation (1) by including MR terms into the gravity esti-




while sample size increases to 3,517 observations.14 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
that the adjusted explanation power of the estimation slightly falls to 75 per-
cent, while the border estimate remains very close compared to the ﬁxed ef-
fects estimation. The border impeding trade effect between the North and the
South persists with a magnitude of 15 percent. In column (6), we ﬁnd that trade
within the South is 1.59 times larger than cross-border trade in 1993, while the
coefﬁcient for the North turns insigniﬁcant.
In the ﬁnal step we explore the CFS data in more detail, as disaggregated
trade ﬂows at the commodity level are available. This is in the spirit of Hillberry
(1999), who estimated commodity speciﬁc border effects for products traded
between Canada and the US in 1993. We pool over all commodities available in
thespeciﬁcyear. Ascommoditiesaresubjecttovaryingtransportationcosts,we
includeorigincommodityanddestinationcommodityﬁxedeffectsfollowing
Chen (2004). For 1993, results for the pooled commodity FE estimation are de-
pictedinTable3column(7). WeﬁndthattheborderreducedNorth-Southtrade
by about 8.6 percent.
Following AvW (2003), we use the model and the parameter estimates to
simulate the ratio of trade with border barriers (BB) to the counterfactual level
of trade under borderless trade (NB).
footnoteDetailed results are in Table A-4 in the Web Appendix. Multilateral re-
sistance increases by 6 percent for states of the South, but only by 1 percent for
those of the North. Moreover, South-South trade rises by 12 percent due to the
border, while North-North trade increases by only 3 percent.
B. Placebo Estimations
Is there something special about trade across the former Union-Confederation
border as opposed to trade across other hypothetical borders? To deal with this
question, we randomly assign 11 out of the 28 ‘old’ US states to a hypothetical
“South” and the remainder to a hypothetical “North”.15 Based on regression (2)
15Thenumberofpotential“South”subsamplesandhenceofstategroupsishuge: 21,474,180.
Estimating all possible border effects between these groups of states is computationally ex-TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 15
of Table 3, we run a million placebo regressions. We ﬁnd a negative and sig-
niﬁcant (at the 10% level) border effect in 13.4 percent of the cases. In 56 cases
thebordereffectisslightlylargerthanthe15.7percentfoundinourbenchmark
case. The largest effect we ﬁnd is 1.6 percentage-points larger than our original
effect, but the standard error is so large that one cannot reject the hypothe-
sis that the effect is identical to the 15.7 benchmark result. In all 56 cases, the
“South” consists predominantly of New England and the Great Lakes States.
FIGURE 2
Placebo Estimations. Frequency and Average Size of Signiﬁcant Border Effects
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(b) Average Border Effect, Absolute Values
Figure 2 compares the hypothetical South to the “true” sample by counting
the number of misallocated states (put into the “wrong” group). Diagram (a)
depicts that about 70 % of all samples, where one state was misallocated, yield
a negative and statistically signiﬁcant border effect. If 2 states are misallocated
that share drops to 55 %; if more than 5 states are put into the “wrong” group
tremely costly. A single regression takes about one second. Computation time then amounts to
249 days.16 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
the share falls to below 10%. Diagram (b) displays the absolute value of the
average border effect found in different subsamples. If one state is allocated to
the“wrong”group, theaveragebordereffectisslightlybelow0.08(ascompared
to 0.16 in the “correct” grouping). The average effect falls quickly as more states
are misallocated and is below 0.007 if 5 or more states are exchanged.16
C. Sensitivity Analysis
Table 4 summarizes border effect estimates obtained from using the 1997, 2002
or2007wavesoftheCommodityFlowSurveyratherthanthemorereliable1993
data. Across the non-linear AvW procedure, the ﬁxed-effects model, the Baier
and Bergstrand (2009) approach, and the the commodity-level regression, we
ﬁnd negative border effects that are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Interestingly,thereisnoevidencethatthebordereffectshrinksovertime. Com-
parison across time is hindered by different sampling across waves. The former
border reduces trade by between 9 and 18 percent, with the average effect clus-
tering around at about 14 percent.
The use of geographical distance as a measure of transportation costs has
been criticized by Head and Mayer (2002). Since 71 to 75 percent of shipments
in the US are transported by truck (Department of Transportation), we use ac-
tual travel time from Google maps as an alternative measure of transportation
costs. Ozimek and Miles (2011) provide a tool to retrieve these data. We ﬁnd
that the use of travel time reduces the estimated border effect in the preferred
1993samplefrom15to11percent, therebyconﬁrmingthehypothesisthatgeo-
graphicaldistanceinﬂatestheestimatedbordereffects. However, acrosswaves,
the effect remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant.17
16In further placebo exercises, we investigate border effects between coastal and interior
states as well as between Eastern and Western states in the whole US. Results are contained
in Table A-2 of the Web Appendix. We do not ﬁnd a border effect between coastal and inte-
rior states. There is no border effect neither at a hypothetical East-West border (approximately
drawn at the 90 longitude line).
17The 1997 wave with its 50,000 sampled ﬁrms is an exception. Detailed results are found in
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TABLE 4
Sensitivity Across Different Survey Waves
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
Data: Aggregated Commodity
——————————————————– ——————
Speciﬁcation: AvW NLS FE OLS with FE
MR Terms Chen (2004)
PANEL A: 1997 (N = 766)
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4)
Border Dummyij -0.128*** -0.091*** -0.126*** -0.138***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Adjusted R2 n.a. 0.866 0.737 0.816
PANEL B: 2002 (N = 739)
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4)
Border Dummyij -0.175*** -0.146*** -0.150*** -0.194***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Adjusted R2 n.a. 0.860 0.715 0.805
PANEL C: 2007 (N = 768)
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4)
Border Dummyij -0.175*** -0.134*** -0.144*** -0.199***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Adjusted R2 n.a. 0.881 0.743 0.788
Notes: Constant,ﬁxedeffects,effectsonlogdistanceandMRtermsarenotreported.
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. n.a. means not applicable. Table
A3 in the Web Appendix contains full results. AvW NLS denotes the Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003) Nonlinear Least Squares Method. Pooling over all commodi-
ties in 1997 (2002; 2007), we have in column (4) 11,275 (7,721; 12,772) observations.
Column(4)includesImporterCommodityandExporterCommodityﬁxedeffects
following Chen (2004). States in sample as in Table 1. District of Columbia is ex-
cluded.*** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, *
Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Tomakesurethatourtreatmentofborderstates(i.e.,stateswhoseallegiance
wasunclearandthatarethereforeexcludedfromourbenchmarksample),does
not bias our results, we assign them alternatively to the South or to the North.
The border states were slave states, but ofﬁcially never seceded, so it is coun-18 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
terfactual to include them into the South. We ﬁnd that the assignment of those
border states does not matter qualitatively for our ﬁndings. Estimated effects
are slightly lower than when border states are excluded altogether.18
D. Estimates by Sector
Finally, we also run regressions sector-by-sector. Table 5 provides summary re-
sults, suppressing other coefﬁcients except the one on the border dummy.19
Theestimatedbordereffectis ^ 1 =   \ (   1);therebyconfoundingtheelastic-
ity of substitution and the trade-cost increasing effect of the border. It is there-
fore not surprising, that the low- agricultural sector features a high but only
moderatelyrobustestimate,whilethelow- miningsectordoesnotdisplayany
border effect. There is no border effect in the machinery sector, neither. This is
presumably due to North-South differences in comparative advantage that the
simple AvW model does not capture. The border effect is most pronounced in
the chemical and manufacturing sectors, where the degree of product differen-
tiation is high (hence,  low). This ﬁnding supports the view that the former
border reﬂects a cultural divide that makes transactions more difﬁcult and that
this is most pronounced in highly differentiated industries.
III. Accounting for Observed Contemporaneous Heterogeneity
A. Benchmark Results
In this section we investigate, whether observable characteristics of state pairs,
omitted in the parsimonious AvW-regressions above, bias the estimated coefﬁ-
cient. We include a large number of contemporaneous determinants of trade
that are discussed in the empirical literature stepwise into the regression. If the
variables are not bilateral in nature, we bilateralize them by either taking the
absolute difference of variables in state i and state j, denoted by the operator
18Detailed results are found in Table A-6 of the Web Appendix.
19Detailed results are found in Table A-6 of the Web Appendix.TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 19
TABLE 5
Sectoral Results (ﬁxed-effects estimation)
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
Sector Agriculture Mining Chemical Machinery Manufacturing
PANEL A: 1993
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
Border Dummyij -0.309*** 0.022 -0.227*** -0.022 -0.068
(0.08) (0.23) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Observations 4,815 1,336 3,078 4,324 11,990
Adjusted R2 0.746 0.757 0.671 0.657 0.757
PANEL B: 1997
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5)
Border Dummyij -0.244*** -0.303* -0.095 -0.072 -0.200***
(0.08) (0.17) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 5,490 2,655 3,215 3,455 7,620
Adjusted R2 0.783 0.774 0.755 0.733 0.803
PANEL C: 2002
(C1) (C) (C3) (C4) (C5)
Border Dummyij -0.176* -0.210 -0.216*** 0.005 -0.271***
(0.09) (0.36) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Observations 4,470 1,629 2,820 3,205 7,080
Adjusted R2 0.773 0.762 0.722 0.695 0.774
PANEL D: 2007
(D1) (D2) (D3) (D4) (D5)
Border Dummyij -0.308*** -0.101 -0.302*** -0.020 -0.277***
(0.07) (0.16) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
Observations 4,171 1,914 3,116 3,472 7,436
Adjusted R2 0.816 0.813 0.766 0.679 0.808
Notes: Importer and exporter ﬁxed effects included in all regressions. Constant, ﬁxed effects
andeffectsonlogdistancenotreported. Robuststandarderrorsreportedinparenthesis. Table
A-7 in the Web Appendix contains full results. Commodities pooled into sectors as listed in
Table A-11 and A-12 in the Web Appendix. States in sample as in Table 1. District of Columbia
excluded.*** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant
at the 10 percent level.
, or by using the product of variables in state i and state j, denoted by the
operator . The product of variables relates to network effects between pairs,20 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
while the  operator focuses on the difference between state pairs.20 Table 6
reports results for our benchmark year 1993. All estimations include origin and
destination ﬁxed effects.
Column (1) of Table 6 adds a single geographical variable to the basic setup:
adjacency. This variable is routinely included in gravity equations, but does not
ﬁgure in the AvW setup. In our sample, and in accordance with the literature,
adjacency increases bilateral trade by about 45 percent. Due to the omission
of border states from our baseline estimations, adjacency correlates negatively
withtheborder. Ifadjacencyincreasestrade,itsomissionwouldbiastheborder
effect away from zero. This is exactly what we ﬁnd: the border effect falls (in
absolute terms) from -0.157 (Table 3 column (2)) to -0.115.21
In column (2), we account for the impact of ethnic, religious, or cultural net-
works(Rauch, 1999; RauchandTrindade, 2002; Combeset al., 2005)andmigra-
tion within the US (Helliwell, 1997; Head and Ries, 1998; Millimet and Osang,
2007). The literature reasons that common culture and tastes increase trade
ﬂows as they facilitate contracts and instill trust; they also make it more likely
that states produce and consume similar goods. Migration and networks might
biasthebordereffectestimateupwardsastheyincreasetradebutarenegatively
associated with the border. To test the impact of networks we include (i) cross-
state migration stocks of people residing in one state but were born in another
taken from the American Community Survey Decennial Census; (ii) the product
oftheshareofAfro-AmericansintotalstatepopulationfromthePopulationEs-
timatesProgram;(iii)theproductoftheJewishpopulationintotalstatepopula-
tion from the American Jewish Yearbook; and (iv) self-reported afﬁnity to Chris-
tianity, otherreligiousgroups, ornoreligionfromtheARIS2008Report, intothe
estimation. We ﬁnd that migration networks, high shares of Afro-Americans, of
populationsharesafﬁliatedtoBuddhism,HinduismorIslam,andofpeoplenot
self-identifying with any religious group spur trade ﬂows. A 1 percent increase
20We tried a range of other variables and combinations, as well as network and difference
variables separately and combinations thereof. The results are robust to these modiﬁcations.
21Clearly, not including adjacency biases all coefﬁcients.TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 21
TABLE 6
Contemporaneous Controls, 1993 (ﬁxed-effects estimation)
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Border Dummyij -0.115*** -0.124*** -0.126*** -0.122*** -0.132*** -0.130***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Geographical Controls
lnDistanceij -0.980*** -0.580*** -0.570*** -0.562*** -0.548*** -0.550***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Adjacencyij 0.446*** 0.335*** 0.341*** 0.362*** 0.381*** 0.384***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Network Controls/Home Bias
lnMigration Stockij 0.182*** 0.179*** 0.151*** 0.150*** 0.147***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Black Shareij 0.000** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Jewish Shareij -0.009** -0.008* -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Christian Shareij 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Other Religion Shareij 0.051** 0.053** 0.051** 0.041 0.041
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
No Religion Shareij 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.009* 0.009*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Urban Shareij 4.001*** 3.860*** 4.317*** 4.344*** 4.369***
(0.74) (0.77) (0.90) (1.12) (1.12)
Home Biasij 0.243** 0.290** 0.360*** 0.349*** 0.362***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Common Colonizerij 0.186*** 0.193*** 0.168*** 0.166*** 0.167***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Labor Market/Political Institutions
Union Membershipij -0.027 -0.031 -0.036* -0.038*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Union Densityij 0.029 0.033 0.038* 0.040*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Minimum Wageij -0.210 -0.253* -0.225 -0.223
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Republicanij 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Judiciary Electionij -0.058* -0.066** -0.065** -0.064**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Heckscher-Ohlin Controls
lnCapital-Labor Ratioij 0.167 0.162 0.119
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18)
lnHigh-Low Skilled Ratioij 0.059 0.062 0.065
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
lnAverage Schoolingij -0.924 -1.016 -1.236
(1.12) (1.13) (1.24)
lnCroplandij -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.045***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
lnFarm Sizeij 0.050 0.024 0.020
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
lnAgricultural to Total Outputij 0.027 -0.002 -0.002
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)










lnIncome per Capitaij 0.132
(0.28)
Observations 768 768 768 768 768 768
Adjusted R2 0.884 0.909 0.909 0.911 0.911 0.911
Notes: Importer and exporter ﬁxed effects included in all regressions. Constant and ﬁxed effects
not reported. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. The operator  denotes the abso-
lute difference of variables in state i and state j. The operator  denotes the product of variables
in state i and state j. *** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, *
Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.22 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
in the bilateral migration stock indicates an increase in trade by 22 percent in
column(2).22 Ifweincludenetworkcontrols,theborderstillturnsouttoreduce
bilateral trade by 11.7 percent.23
Column (2) also contains a variable measuring home bias. Speciﬁcally, we
follow the literature and include an indicator variable that is unity for within
state trade and zero otherwise. The estimate is signiﬁcant in column (2) and
suggests that trade is on average 24 percent larger within a state than across
states. Our estimate is half the size what is on average found in the literature on
the US, using identical data but more parsimonious models (Wolf, 2000; Hill-
berryandHummels,2003;MillimetandOsang,2007;CoughlinandNovy,2009).
The home bias effect relates to informational frictions, such as transaction and
search costs, that lead to spacial clustering of economic activity within states.
However, as we control for networks that partly capture these determinants the
home bias effect is strongly reduced. In addition, common colonial heritage,
also included in column (2), may have lasting effects on bilateral trade.24 We
constructanindicatorvariablethattakesvalueoneifapairofstateshadacom-
mon colonizer (Britain, France or Spain) and zero otherwise. We ﬁnd that a
common colonial past increases bilateral trade by about 19 percent. Yet, while
most of those network variables matter statistically, they do not reduce the es-
timated border effect. If at all, they leave it slightly higher.
Column (3) examines the impact of labor market and political institutions.
We control for labor market institutions by including dissimilarities in union
membership and density from Hirsch et al. (2001), as well as a dummy for the
existence of minimum wage legislation provided by the US Department of La-
bor. In theory, differences in labor market institutions could increase bilateral
trade, becausedifferentiallegislationactsasasourceofcomparativeadvantage
as in Cunat and Melitz (2009). In our analysis, we ﬁnd that institutional dif-
ferences tend to reduce trade (albeit statistical precision of estimates is low).
22A similar effect has been identiﬁed by Combes et al. (2005) for trade within France.
23100  (exp( 0:124)   1).
24See, for instance, Head et al. (2010).TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 23
This may signal that institutional differences are caused by some deeper differ-
ences in cultural norms and that the latter discourage trade by more. Column
(3) also controls for differences in the political alignment in the 1992 presiden-
tial election (Clinton against Bush sen.) and whether states elect or appoint
the judiciary. Voting behavior has no statistically measurable effect on trade,
while the difference in judiciary appointment procedure turns out to depress
bilateral trade ﬂows. The estimated border effect, however, remains virtually
unchanged.
In column (4), we include controls for the difference in relative factor en-
dowments of states, thereby accounting for the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory.
Omitting differences in factor proportions might lead to an upward bias of the
border coefﬁcient, as differences in factor proportions should increase trade
ﬂows and appear to be more pronounced when the border is present. To mea-
sure contemporaneous differences in relative factor proportions and human
capital accumulation, we include the absolute difference in (i) capital-labor
sharesfromTurneretal. (2008); (ii)sharesofhighandlowskilledinthepopula-
tion25; (iii) average years of schooling for the population over 25 from Turner et
al. (2007); (iv) cropland from the National Resource Inventory Summary Report;
(v) average farm size from the Census of Agriculture ; (vi) agricultural relative to
total output; and (vii) manufacturing relative to total output from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. As in other gravity exercises, classical Heckscher-Ohlin
variables do not show up statistically signiﬁcant, though both the variables on
the difference in the capital-labor ratio and the difference in relative skill en-
dowment bear the right sign. Differences in the availability of cropland reduce
bilateraltrade,asdodifferencesintheshareofmanufacturingoutput. Contem-
poraneous differences in factor endowments do not capture the border, which
still reduces North-South trade by 11.5 percent.26
25We measure high skilled by a Bachelor’s degree or above and low skilled by a High School
degree or below. Data stem from the Census of Population and the American Community Sur-
vey.
26100  (exp( 0:122)   1).24 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
Column (5) includes demographic variables such as the difference in con-
temporaneous population and population density from the Population Esti-
mates Program, as well as fertility rates from the Vital Statistics of the United
States. Commondemographicfeaturesacrossstatesmaysuggestcommonpref-
erences, so that bilateral trade is larger for such states. The estimated parame-
ters, however, are insigniﬁcant throughout. The border effect remains negative
and signiﬁcant.
Finally, following the literature on the Linder effect, we include the differ-
ence in the log of per capita income as in Thursby and Thursby (1987),
Bergstrand (1989), and Hallak(2010). The hypothesis is that states with dis-
similar GDP per capita should have differing preference structures and, hence,
trade less. Since the border correlates negatively with GDP per capita in the
data, omitting the Linder term may bias the border effect away from zero. This
is, however, not what we ﬁnd. In column (6), we fail to ﬁnd support for the
Linder hypothesis; the estimated border effect does not move. We have also ex-
perimented with direct measures of inequality (Gini coefﬁcients), but without
success.
Column (6) represents our most comprehensive and preferred model. The
border effect is about 12.2 percent.27 It explains more than 91 percent of the
variation in bilateral trade ﬂows, 85 percent of which are attributable to in-
cluded variables and controls.28
B. Sensitivity Analysis
Table 7 summarizes sensitivity results pertaining to the comprehensive model
in column (6) of Table 6.29 Panel A deploys the FE approach. Our baseline bor-
dereffectof-0.130isreportedincolumn(A1). Weﬁndanegativeandsigniﬁcant
27100  (exp( 0:130)   1).
28A model that explains bilateral trade solely using importer and exporter ﬁxed effects can
only explain 6 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. In additional regressions,
we include differences in export openness to the rest of the World (ROW) (jexportsiROW=Yi  
exportsjROW=Yjj). This does not change any results.
29Details are relegated to Table A-8 in the Web Appendix.TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 25
border effect for 1993 and 2002, while the effect for 1997 and 2007 remains neg-
ative but insigniﬁcant. Results based on the commodity ﬂow survey from 1997
onwards suffer from the fact that the number of ﬁrms surveyed is only 50,000
or 25 percent of those surveyed in 1993. In Panel B we turn to our model that
includes MR terms directly in the estimation. The border barrier turns out to
be strong in 1993 and 1997 using the MR approach. If we use the pooled com-
modityFEsetupwithimportercommodityanddestinationcommodityﬁxed
effects following Chen (2004) in Panel C, we ﬁnd strong trade impeding effect
for all years. Overall, we can conclude that the ﬁndings on the border effect
compare well, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to our earlier results. The
border reduces cross-border trade by 7 to 19 percent, depending on the year
and the speciﬁcation.30
IV. Accounting for Historical Determinants
A. Benchmark Results
Theeconomicliteratureontheemergenceofarmedconﬂictsshowsthatstrong
bilateral trade links decrease the probability that two countries go to war, while
multilateral openness increases the odds of conﬂict (Martin et al., 2008). If de-
terminants of bilateral trade are persistent over time, the border could not be
considered exogenous in the statistical sense. Historical bilateral trade data
is, however, not available. But, one can include historical variables that may,
through their impact on historical trade patterns, affect the probability of con-
ﬂict (and thus the incidence of the border). Moreover, Eichengreen and Irwin
(1998) suggest that history might affect contemporaneous trade ﬂows through
persistent effects on institutions.
AccordingtoEngermanandSokoloff(2000and2005), dissimilaritiesinagri-
30When we work with sectoral data and include the additional controls, results suggests that
the trade impeding effect is mainly caused by barriers to manufacturing products in all years.
Compared to our earlier results, the border effect is negative but less robust for agriculture and
chemicals – except for 2002. Mining and machinery products again depict in most cases an
indistinguishable coefﬁcient from zero. Table A-9 in the Web Appendix reports detailed results.26 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
TABLE 7
Controls, Alternative Samples and Models: Summary Results
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
Year of Data: 1993 1997 2002 2007
PANEL A: FIXED EFFECTS
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4)
Border Dummyij -0.130*** -0.056 -0.119* -0.008
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 768 766 739 768
Adjusted R2 0.911 0.904 0.893 0.914
PANEL B: OLS WITH MR TERMS
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4)
Border Dummyij -0.114** -0.201*** -0.092 -0.045
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Observations 768 766 739 768
Adjusted R2 0.853 0.866 0.829 0.852
PANEL C: POOLED COMMODITY FE (Chen 2004)
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4)
Border Dummyij -0.215*** -0.118*** -0.072* -0.126***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 13,303 11,275 7,721 12,772
Adjusted R2 0.655 0.836 0.822 0.804
Notes: Constant, ﬁxed effects, MR terms and controls not reported. Robust
standard errors reported in parenthesis. All models include variables of Table
6 column (6) as additional controls. Full results are reported in Table A-8 in
the Web Appendix. *** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at the 5
percent level, * Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
culturallanduse,drivenbysoilendowmentsandclimate,ledtotheSouthadopt-
ing slavery and, more broadly, to the emergence of conﬂicting economic inter-
ests between the North and the South, and ultimately, to the Secession. The
different economic models may have long-lasting effects on inequality within
states,whichmay,inturn,berelevantfortoday’slevelofeconomictransactions
(Linder effect). It may also have persistent effects on institutions, which affect
contemporaneous bilateral trade. The historical settlement structure may have
inducednetworksalongculturallinesthatsurvivedovertime.31 Absolutediffer-
31The analysis relates to the literature on the long-term impact of factor endowments andTRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 27
ences in historical variables are positively correlated to the border, so that their
omission may bias the estimated border effect away from zero.
Toaccountforthesepossibilities,Table8includeshistoricaldifferencesin(i)
cropland; (ii) average farms size; (iii) population density; and (iv) illiteracy rates
of the non-slave population.32 In column (1) to (3), we ﬁnd that none of these
variables matter statistically, except for historical farm size differences which
are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. Including farm size increases rather then
decreases the border coefﬁcient to  0:230. This is surprising as historical farm
size differences correlate positively with the border.
One would expect the legacy of slavery to partly capture the border barrier
in column (4). However, we ﬁnd that differences in slave shares in 1860 exert no
impact on bilateral trade patterns and do not explain away the border barrier.33
Interestingly, the inclusion of the absolute difference in shares of free blacks in
1860 exerts a positive and signiﬁcant effect on contemporaneous trade.
In addition, similarities in culture due to similar settlement structures in US
states before the war could have induced social and business networks that
have survived over time and still affect trade. We therefore include the prod-
uct in the shares of French, Spanish, Irish, British and German settlers in 1860.
While Spanish heritage has no particular impact on trade, Irish heritage de-
creases bilateral trade signiﬁcantly in column (5). States with a large share of
French settlers trade more amongst each other. The same is true for states with
high shares of German or British settlers, but the impact of German networks
vanishes with the inclusion of further variables in subsequent columns.
According to Acemoglu et al. (2002), historical climatic differences mea-
sured by the incidence of malaria, may have affected the characteristics and
institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2002; Nunn, 2009; Galor et al., 2009).
32Additionally,allmodelsincludeouradditionalcontemporaneouscontrolsfromTable6col-
umn (6) and importer as well as exporter ﬁxed effects.
33If we use the difference in the share of slaves in 1840, when there were still slaves also living
in the North, we still ﬁnd robust results on the border effect but an insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient
close to zero for the slave share. In column (7), the effect of differences in 1840 slaves is still
zero, while that of the illiterate of the non-slave population turns signiﬁcant and positive. The
border effect remains negative and signiﬁcant on the 1 percent level.28 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
TABLE 8
Contemporaneous and Historical Controls, 1993 (ﬁxed-effects estimation)
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Border Dummyij -0.230*** -0.132*** -0.159*** -0.155* -0.130*** -0.141*** -0.235**
(0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
Controls as of Table 6 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
column (6) included
Historical Controls
ln1860 Croplandij -0.023 -0.032
(0.02) (0.02)
ln1860 Farm Sizeij 0.138* 0.117
(0.08) (0.09)
ln1860 Population Densityij 0.022 0.017
(0.02) (0.02)
ln1860 Illiteracy Ratesij 0.004 0.008
(0.00) (0.00)
1860 Slave Shareij 0.001 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
1860 Free Black Shareij 0.040** 0.049**
(0.02) (0.02)
1860 French Shareij 0.404*** 0.420***
(0.14) (0.15)
1860 Spanish Shareij -10.084 -9.972
(9.02) (8.97)
1860 Irish Shareij -0.003** -0.003**
(0.00) (0.00)
1860 German Shareij 0.002* 0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
1860 British Shareij 0.004* 0.005*
(0.00) (0.00)
1860 Malaria Riskij 0.180 0.143
(0.25) (0.30)
Observations 768 768 768 768 768 768 768
Adjusted R2 0.911 0.911 0.911 0.911 0.914 0.911 0.915
Notes: Importer and exporter ﬁxed effects included in all regressions. Constant and ﬁxed effects
not reported. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. The operator  denotes the absolute
difference of variables in state i and state j. The operator  denotes the product of variables in
state i and state j. All models include variables as of column (6), Table 6 as additional controls. ***
Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
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quality of institutions. In the present case, it is conceivable that the high risk of
malaria in the South has led to acceptance of slavery by the local elite and may
therefore constitute a deep reason for the conﬂict. It may also affect contempo-
raneous trade ﬂows through its lasting effect on institutions. So, we include the
malaria risk index in 1860 from Hong (2007). We ﬁnd neither a signiﬁcant effect
ontradenordoeshistoricalclimateexplainawaytheborder. Inthelastcolumn,
weincludeallhistoricalcontrolssimultaneouslyinourmodel. Allinall,weﬁnd
that the border reduces trade by 20.9 percent,34 even when we include variables
capturing the historical determinants of the Secession.35
B. Including the West
From the previous analysis, one cannot conclude that the Secession has caused
theobservedbordereffectincontemporaneoustradedata. Includinghistorical
variablesthatrelatetothedeepreasonsfortheCivilWargoessomewayindeal-
ing with reverse causation. However, it fails to account for unobserved shocks
that both make the odds for Secession and today’s bilateral trade ﬂows larger.
Unfortunately, no instrument is ready-to-use in an IV approach.
Onewaytonudgetheanalysisclosertoidentifyingacausaleffectconsistsin
separatingthewhole oftheUS–includingtheWest–intostatesthatunderwent
a treatment by the Secession and states that were not affected by these histori-
cal events. We separate the states into three groups – the North, the South, and
the West –, still excluding border states, the District of Columbia, Alaska and
Hawaii.36 The border dummy is unity for states that found themselves on op-
posite sides of the Civil War and zero for all other pairs of states. Adding the
West adds a control set of state pairs that are characterized by their absence of
a past shaped by the Civil War.
34100  (exp( 0:235)   1).
35We have also experimented with direct measures for the historical transportation system
(differences or networks of railroad miles per 100 square miles of land area after the Civil War
in 1870). The result is robust to the inclusion of the historical transportation system.
36West includes all US states that were not assigned to the North, the South or the border
states in Table 1, excluding the District of Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii.30 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
TABLE 9
Additionally Including the West, 1993
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
Data: Aggregated Commodity
——————————————————– ——————
Speciﬁcation: Fixed Effects OLS with MR Terms Chen (2004) FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Border Dummyij -0.073* -0.119*** -0.198***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
South–South Dummyij 0.240*** 0.242***
(0.07) (0.09)
North–North Dummyij 0.276 0.375***
(0.91) (0.04)
West–West Dummyij -0.036 0.232***
(0.09) (0.08)
lnDistanceij -0.358*** -0.358*** -0.690*** -0.611*** -0.163***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Additional Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,739 1,739 1,739 1,739 24,948
Adjusted R2 0.851 0.852 0.734 0.747 0.631
Notes: Constant,ﬁxedeffects,MRtermsandcontrolsnotreported. Robuststandard
errors reported in parenthesis. All models include variables as of column (6), Table
6 available for all US states as additional controls. *** Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level, ** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 9 reports the results. All models include additional contemporaneous
controls.37 In columns (1), (3) and (5), we ﬁnd for the ﬁxed effects, the OLS
with MR terms, and the pooled commodity FE regression a signiﬁcant trade
impeding effect of the Secession treatment. The effect ranges between 7 and
18 percent. In addition, we again ﬁnd in column (2) that the South trades more
amongst each other while the effect on the North is positive but insigniﬁcant.
There seems not to be any particular trade effect within Western states. The
picture looks different when we directly control for multilateral resistance in
column(4). Inthissetup,allregionstradesigniﬁcantlymoreamongthemselves
than with states of the other regions.38
37Historical controls are not available for most of the Western states before the war, as these
were only Territories in 1860.
38Results are similar for the other years and can be found in Table A-10 in the Web Appendix.TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION 31
V. Civil War at 150: Still Relevant, Still Divisive
TheformerborderbetweentheUnionandtheConfederationisstillrelevantto-
day: ThedefunctborderrepresentsatradebarrierthatlowerstradebetweenUS
states by on average 7 to 20 percent. In a million placebo estimations, we ﬁnd
supportive evidence that the magnitude of this border effect is unique. The re-
sultisrobusttousingalternativewavesoftheCommodityFlowSurvey,todiffer-
enteconometricmethods, ortotheinclusionofWesternstatesortherestofthe
world. It cannot be substantially attenuated, let alone eliminated, by adding a
vast array of contemporaneous and historical variables that correlate both with
the border dummy and, potentially, also with bilateral trade.
The great Mississippi novelist and poet William Faulkner famously writes
“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.” (Requiem for a Nun, 1951). This
holds true for the Secession that tore the US apart 150 years ago, even when the
judgment is based on bilateral trade data and econometric analysis: Trade be-
tween the former Confederation and the former Union is about 14.5 percent
smaller on average than within the alliance. A number of additional results
seem important: First, the effect of the long defunct border on today’s trade
is not attributable to the legacy of slavery alone. It becomes weaker if not the
Secession but the status of slave states is the criterion for belonging to one of
the two groups. Second, the border effect is not merely a North-South effect.
When the border is redeﬁned to reﬂect whether two states have been on op-
posing sides in the Civil War, it remains signiﬁcantly negative. Third, the trade
inhibitingforceoftheformerborderhastodowiththedegreeofdifferentiation
of products: the higher, the stronger. This suggests that the channel through
which the border still matters may be through cultural afﬁnity or trust.32 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
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Web Appendix
TABLE A-1
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND DATA SOURCES, 1993
Unit of Observation: Pairs of States
Sample Full North–South Data Source
(N = 768) (N = 364)
Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
lnzij -16.130 1.084 -16.590 0.637 Commodity Flow Survey; Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Borderij 0.474 0.5 1.000 0.000 own calculations.
lnDistij 6.736 0.855 7.131 0.410 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
Adjacencyij 0.147 0.354 0.000 0.000 own calculations.
lnMigration Stockij 9.936 1.785 9.501 1.524 American Community Survey.
Black Shareij 184.306 211.97 172.135 141.202 Population Estimates Program.
Jewish Shareij 2.545 6.192 1.665 4.180 The American Jewish Yearbook.
Christian Shareij 7877.5 475.79 7961.91 375.65 ARIS 2008 Report.
Other Religion Shareij 1.096 1.056 1.038 0.888 ARIS 2008 Report.
No Religion Shareij 43.612 21.336 38.286 15.999 ARIS 2008 Report.
Urban Shareij 0.490 0.146 0.478 0.133 Census of Population and Housing.
Home Biasij 0.036 0.188 0.000 0.000 own calculations.
Colonizerij 0.564 0.496 0.530 0.500 own calculations.
ln1860 Croplandij 1.028 0.827 1.028 0.776 Census of Agriculture 1860.
ln1860 Farm Sizeij 0.667 0.529 1.150 0.328 Census of Agriculture 1860.
ln1860 Population Densityij 1.356 1.112 1.477 1.059 Census of Population and Housing 1860.
ln1860 Illiteracy Ratesij 6.216 5.179 9.897 4.690 Census of Population and Housing 1860.
1860 Slave Shareij 20.724 20.236 39.662 10.869 Census of Population and Housing 1860.
1860 Free Black Shareij 1.155 1.039 1.212 1.046 Census of Population and Housing 1860.
1860 French Shareij 0.080 0.227 0.754 0.215 Census of Population and Housing 1860.
1860 Spanish Shareij 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 Census of Population and Housing 1860.
1860 Irish Shareij 20.582 34.582 6.217 8.991 Census of Population and Housing 1860.
1860 German Shareij 10.662 22.872 4.229 8.391 Census of Population and Housing 1860.
1860 British Shareij 7.241 11.656 1.287 1.124 Census of Population and Housing 1860.
1860 Malaria Riskij 0.144 0.106 0.224 0.088 Hong (2007).
lnCapital-Labor Ratioij 0.271 0.215 0.277 0.210 Turner et al. (2008).
lnHigh-Low Skilled Ratioij 0.434 0.312 0.560 0.324 Census of Population; American Community Survey.
lnAverage Schoolingij 0.034 0.025 0.044 0.027 Turner et al. (2007).
lnCroplandij 1.855 1.619 1.895 1.380 National Resource Inventory Summary Report.
lnFarm Sizeij 0.551 0.463 0.561 0.466 Census of Agriculture.
lnAgricultural To Total Outputij 0.682 0.511 0.709 0.488 Bureau of Economic Analysis.
lnManufacturing To Total Outputij 0.318 0.258 0.338 0.260 Bureau of Economic Analysis.
lnPopulationij 0.960 0.744 0.947 0.702 Population Estimates Program.
lnPopulation Densityij 1.063 0.82 1.092 0.770 Population Estimates Program.
lnFertilityij 0.077 0.065 0.082 0.069 Vital Statistics of the United States.
lnIncome Per Capitaij 0.144 0.119 0.158 0.128 Bureau of Economic Analysis; Population Estimates Program.
Union Membershipij 7.376 5.54 10.044 5.499 Hirsch et al. (2001).
Union Densityij 7.198 5.375 9.784 5.413 Hirsch et al. (2001).
Minimum Wageij 0.083 0.121 0.083 0.105 US Department of Labor.
Republicanij 0.434 0.496 0.604 0.490 The American Presidency Project.
Judiciary Electionij 0.452 0.498 0.434 0.496 own calculations.
Notes: Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis stem from the Regional Economic Accounts. Contemporaneous variables if not stated
otherwise. The operator  denotes the absolute difference of variables between state i and state j. The operator  denotes the product of
variables in state i and state j.WEB APPENDIX TO: TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION A-3
TABLE A-2
Placebo Coast-Interior and East-West, 1993
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
Coast-Interior (N = 2,137) East-West (N = 2,137)
————————————– ————————————–
Speciﬁcation AvW NLS Fixed Effects AvW NLS Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Border Dummyij 0.021 -0.015 0.113*** -0.037
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Coast-Coastij=East-East Dummyij -0.244* 0.491***
(0.14) (0.16)
Interior-Interiorij=West-West Dummyij 0.273** 0.075
(0.14) (0.06)
lnDistanceij -0.860*** -1.220*** -1.220*** -0.865*** -1.211*** -1.211***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Fixed Effects
Importer n.a. YES YES n.a. YES YES
Exporter n.a. YES YES n.a. YES YES
Adjusted R2 n.a. 0.788 0.788 n.a. 0.788 0.788
Notes: Constant and ﬁxed effects not reported. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. n.a. means
not applicable. AvW NLS denotes the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) Nonlinear Least Squares Method.
Coast: Connecticut, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vir-
ginia, Vermont, Washington. Interior: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wiscon-
sin, Wyoming. West: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming. East: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, In-
diana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin. District of Columbia, Hawaii and Alaska excluded.
Signiﬁcance levels as in Table 3.A-4 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
TABLE A-3
Sensitivity Analysis Various Years
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
Data Aggregated Commodity
—————————————————- —————–
Speciﬁcation AvW NLS FE OLS with FE
MR Terms Chen (2004)
Year of Data 1997 (N = 766)
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4)
Border Dummyij -0.128*** -0.091*** -0.126*** -0.138***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
lnDistanceij -0.978*** -1.104*** -1.032*** -1.140***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 n.a. 0.866 0.737 0.816
Year of Data 2002 (N = 739)
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4)
Border Dummyij -0.175*** -0.146*** -0.150*** -0.194***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02)
lnDistanceij -1.071*** -1.136*** -1.066*** -1.091***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 n.a. 0.860 0.715 0.805
Year of Data 2007 (N = 768)
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4)
Border Dummyij -0.175*** -0.134*** -0.144*** -0.199***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
lnDistanceij -1.087*** -1.180*** -1.116*** -1.216***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 n.a. 0.881 0.743 0.788
Fixed Effects
Importer n.a. YES - -
Exporter n.a. YES - -
ImporterCommodity n.a. - - YES
ExporterCommodity n.a. - - YES
Multilateral Resistance n.a. - YES -
Notes: Constant, ﬁxed effects and MR terms not reported. Robust standard errors reported
in parenthesis. n.a. means not applicable. AvW NLS denotes the Anderson and van Win-
coop (2003) Nonlinear Least Squares Method. States in sample as in Table 1. District of
Columbia is excluded. Pooling over all commodities in 1997 (2002; 2007), we have in col-
umn (4) 11,275 (7,721; 12,772) observations. Signiﬁcance levels as in Table 3.WEB APPENDIX TO: TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION A-5
TABLE A-4
Counterfactual from AvW NLS, 1993
Average of P1 
North South
With border barrier (BB) 0.73 0.87
(0.02) (0.03)
Borderless trade (NB) 0.72 0.82
(0.02) (0.02)
Ratio (BB/NB) 1.01 1.06
(0.01) (0.02)
Impact of Border Barriers on Bilateral Trade
North–North South–South North–South
Ratio BB/NB 1.03 1.12 0.80
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
Due to bilateral resistance 1.00 1.00 1.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
Due to multilateral resistance 1.03 1.12 1.07
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Notes: The upper part of the Table reports the average of P
1 
i . For the North the
average is taken over the 17 states in the sample, for the South over the 11 states.
The lower part of the Table reports the ratio of trade with the estimated border
barriers (BB) to that under borderless trade (NB). This ratio is broken down into
the impact of border barriers on trade through bilateral resistance and through
multilateral resistance.A-6 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
TABLE A-5
Alternative Distance Measure (ﬁxed-effects estimation)
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
Year of Data 1993 1997 2002 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Border Dummyij -0.119*** -0.053* -0.105*** -0.093***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
South-South Dummyij 0.458*** 0.172 0.514*** 0.103
(0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12)
North-North Dummyij -0.220** -0.066 -0.304** 0.082
(0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11)
lnTravel Distanceij -1.156*** -1.156*** -1.149*** -1.149*** -1.184*** -1.184*** -1.230*** -1.230***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Fixed Effects
Importer YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Exporter YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 768 768 766 766 739 739 768 768
Adjusted R2 0.878 0.878 0.869 0.869 0.864 0.864 0.886 0.886
Notes: Constant and ﬁxed effects not reported. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. True travel
distance between states – obtained from Google – used as distance measure. Signiﬁcance levels as in Table 3.WEB APPENDIX TO: TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION A-7
TABLE A-6
Sensitivity Analysis: Allocation of Border States, 1993
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
Border States in South Border States in North
—————————————— ——————————————
Speciﬁcation AvW NLS Fixed Effects AvW NLS Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Border Dummyij -0.154*** -0.104*** -0.150*** -0.131***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
South-South Dummyij 0.659*** 0.263***
(0.10) (0.06)
North-North Dummyij 0.208*** -0.331***
(0.05) (0.09)
lnDistanceij -0.983*** -1.117*** -1.117*** -0.987*** -1.112*** -1.112***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Fixed Effects
Importer n.a. YES YES n.a. YES YES
Exporter n.a. YES YES n.a. YES YES
Observations 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057
Adjusted R2 n.a. 0.845 0.845 n.a. 0.846 0.846
Notes: Constant and ﬁxed effects not reported. Robust standard errors reported in paren-
thesis. n.a. meansnotapplicable. AvWNLSdenotestheAndersonandvanWincoop(2003)
Nonlinear Least Squares Method. Column (1) to (3) allocate border states (Delaware, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Missouri, West Virginia) to South as listed in Table 1. North as in Table
1. Column (4) to (6) allocate border states (Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, West
Virginia) to North as listed in Table 1. South as in Table 1. District of Columbia excluded.
Signiﬁcance levels as in Table 3.A-8 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
TABLE A-7
SECTORAL REGRESSIONS (ﬁxed-effects estimation)
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
Sector Agriculture Mining Chemical Machinery Manufacturing
Year of Data 1993
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
Border Dummyij -0.309*** 0.022 -0.227*** -0.022 -0.068
(0.08) (0.23) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
lnDistanceij -1.346*** -1.595*** -1.209*** -1.047*** -1.089***
(0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 4,815 1,336 3,078 4,324 11,990
Adjusted R2 0.746 0.757 0.671 0.657 0.757
Year of Data 1997
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5)
Border Dummyij -0.244*** -0.303* -0.095 -0.072 -0.200***
(0.08) (0.17) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
lnDistanceij -1.600*** -2.119*** -1.308*** -1.176*** -1.168***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 5,490 2,655 3,215 3,455 7,620
Adjusted R2 0.783 0.774 0.755 0.733 0.803
Year of Data 2002
(C1) (C) (C3) (C4) (C5)
Border Dummyij -0.176* -0.210 -0.216*** 0.005 -0.271***
(0.09) (0.36) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
lnDistanceij -1.469*** -2.028*** -1.264*** -1.138*** -1.252***
(0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 4,470 1,629 2,820 3,205 7,080
Adjusted R2 0.773 0.762 0.722 0.695 0.774
Year of Data 2007
(D1) (D2) (D3) (D4) (D5)
Border Dummyij -0.308*** -0.101 -0.302*** -0.020 -0.277***
(0.07) (0.16) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
lnDistanceij -1.594*** -2.338*** -1.246*** -1.168*** -1.263***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 4,171 1,914 3,116 3,472 7,436
Adjusted R2 0.816 0.813 0.766 0.679 0.808
Notes: Importer and exporter ﬁxed effects included in all regressions. Constant and ﬁxed
effects not reported. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Commodities pooled
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TABLE A-9
Sectoral Regressions Including Controls (ﬁxed-effects estimation)
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
Sector Agriculture Mining Chemical Machinery Manufacturing
Year of Data 1993
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
Border Dummyij -0.284** -0.388 -0.240** -0.162 -0.180**
(0.11) (0.36) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09)
lnDistanceij -0.665*** -0.478* -0.299** -0.312*** -0.236***
(0.12) (0.27) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09)
Additional Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,815 1,336 3,078 4,324 11,990
Adjusted R2 0.788 0.827 0.738 0.711 0.808
Year of Data 1997
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5)
Border Dummyij -0.165 -0.434 -0.050 -0.205** -0.153**
(0.13) (0.33) (0.12) (0.10) (0.07)
lnDistanceij -0.727*** -0.688** -0.517*** -0.503*** -0.487***
(0.13) (0.27) (0.14) (0.15) (0.07)
Additional Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,490 2,655 3,215 3,455 7,620
Adjusted R2 0.828 0.834 0.802 0.780 0.843
Year of Data 2002
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5)
Border Dummyij -0.116 -1.073** 0.115 0.046 -0.107
(0.17) (0.53) (0.15) (0.13) (0.10)
lnDistanceij -0.567*** -0.050 -0.682*** -0.547*** -0.618***
(0.15) (0.41) (0.15) (0.13) (0.10)
Additional Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,470 1,629 2,820 3,205 7,080
Adjusted R2 0.813 0.848 0.761 0.730 0.815
Year of Data 2007
(D1) (D2) (D3) (D4) (D5)
Border Dummyij -0.122 0.096 -0.014 -0.052 -0.293***
(0.12) (0.31) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08)
lnDistanceij -0.772*** -1.353*** -0.782*** -0.514*** -0.568***
(0.12) (0.28) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09)
Additional Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,171 1,914 3,116 3,472 7,436
Adjusted R2 0.847 0.839 0.790 0.720 0.853
Notes: Importer and exporter ﬁxed effects included in all regressions. Constant, controls and
ﬁxed effects not reported. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. All models include
variables as of column (6), Table 6 as additional controls. Commodities pooled into sectors as
listed in Table A-11 and A-12 in the Appendix. Signiﬁcance levels as in Table 3.WEB APPENDIX TO: TRADE AND THE AMERICAN SECESSION A-11
TABLE A-10
Additionally Including the West: Sensitivity
Dependent Variable: ln bilateral exports between i and j relative to states’ GDPs
Data Aggregated Commodity
————————————————————————— ——————–
Speciﬁcation Fixed Effects OLS with MR Terms Chen (2004) FE
Year of Data 1997 (N = 1,699)
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
Border Dummyij -0.081* -0.224*** -0.146***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
South–South Dummyij 0.110 -0.057
(0.08) (0.08)
North–North Dummyij -1.085 -0.099***
(1.15) (0.04)
West–West Dummyij 0.011 0.192***
(0.08) (0.07)
lnDistanceij -0.324*** -0.328*** -0.595*** -0.600*** -0.433***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Additional Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.844 0.844 0.759 0.759 0.826
Year of Data 2002 (N = 1,649)
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5)
Border Dummyij -0.110** -0.102** -0.176***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
South–South Dummyij 0.104 -0.042
(0.09) (0.09)
North–North Dummyij 0.104 0.008
(0.06) (0.05)
West–West Dummyij -0.131 0.089
(0.09) (0.08)
lnDistanceij -0.391*** -0.395*** -0.741*** -0.729*** -0.399***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Additional Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.847 0.847 0.732 0.731 0.822
Year of Data 2007 (N = 1,725)
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5)
Border Dummyij -0.013 -0.048 -0.132***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02)
South–South Dummyij 0.062 -0.067
(0.08) (0.08)
North–North Dummyij 0.007 0.043
(0.06) (0.05)
West–West Dummyij 0.041 0.108
(0.09) (0.08)
lnDistanceij -0.456*** -0.445*** -0.771*** -0.746*** -0.505***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Additional Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.857 0.857 0.748 0.748 0.787
Fixed Effects
Importer YES YES - - -
Exporter YES YES - - -
ImporterCommodity - - - - YES
ExporterCommodity - - - - YES
Multilateral Resistance - - YES YES -
Notes: Constant, ﬁxed effects, MR terms and controls not reported. Robust standard errors reported
in parenthesis. All models include variables as of column (6), Table 6 available for all states as addi-
tional controls. Pooling over all commodities in 1997 (2002; 2007), we have in column (5) 18,185 (12,003;
22,101) observations. Signiﬁcance levels as in Table 3.A-12 FELBERMAYR AND GRÖSCHL
TABLE A-11
1993 Standard Transportation Commodity Codes (STCC)
Commodity Meaning Agriculture Mining Chemical Machinery Manufacturing
1 Farm Products x
8 Forest Products x
9 Fresh Fish or Other Marine Products x
10 Metallic Ores x
11 Coal x
13 Crude Petroleum, Natural Gas, Gasoline x
14 Non-metallic Minerals x
19 Ordinance or Accessories
20 Food or Kindred Products x
21 Tobacco Products, excluding Insecticides x
22 Textile Mill Products x
23 Apparel or Other Finished Textile Products x
24 Lumber or Wood Products, excluding Furniture x
25 Furniture or Fixtures x
26 Pulp, Paper, Allied Products x
27 Printed Matter x
28 Chemicals or Allied Products x
29 Petroleum or Coal Products x
30 Rubber or Miscellaneous Plastics Products x
31 Leather or Leather Products x
32 Clay, Concrete, Glass, Stone Products x
33 Primary Metal Products x
34 Fabricated Metal Products x
35 Machinery, excluding Electrical x
36 Electrical Machinery, Equipment, Supplies x
37 Transportation Equipment x
38 Instruments, Photographic and Optical Goods x
39 Miscellaneous Products of Manufacturing x
40 Waste or Scrap Materials
41 Miscellaneous Freight Shipments
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TABLE A-12
1997, 2002, 2007 Standard Classiﬁcation of Transported Goods (SCTG)
Commodity Meaning Agriculture Mining Chemical Machinery Manufacturing
1 Live animals and live ﬁsh x
2 Cereal grains x
3 Other agricultural products x
4 Animal feed and products of animal origin, n.e.c. x
5 Meat, ﬁsh, seafood, and preparations x
6 Milled grain products, bakery products x
7 Other prepared foodstuffs, fats, oils x
8 Alcoholic beverages x
9 Tobacco products x
10 Monumental or building stone x
11 Natural sands x
12 Gravel and crushed stone x
13 Nonmetallic minerals n.e.c. x
14 Metallic ores and concentrates x
15 Coal x
17 Gasoline and aviation turbine fuel x
18 Fuel oils x
19 Coal and petroleum products, n.e.c. x
20 Basic chemicals x
21 Pharmaceutical products x
22 Fertilizers x
23 Chemical products and preparations, n.e.c. x
24 Plastics and rubber x
25 Logs and other wood in the rough x
26 Wood products x
27 Pulp, newsprint, paper, and paperboard x
28 Paper or paperboard articles x
29 Printed products x
30 Textiles, leather, articles of textiles or leather x
31 Nonmetallic mineral products x
32 Base metal in primary or semiﬁnished forms x
33 Articles of base metal x
34 Machinery x
35 Electronic and ofﬁce equipment and components x
36 Motorized and other vehicles (including parts) x
37 Transportation equipment, n.e.c. x
38 Precision instruments and apparatus x
39 Furniture, mattresses and supports, lamps x
40 Miscellaneous manufactured products x
41 Waste and scrap
43 Mixed freight   
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